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FINAL DRAFT - NOT FOR CIRCULATION 
STEVE KEIRL 
IHDE’S PRAXIS PHILOSOPHIES AND DESIGN 
AND TECHNOLOGY EDUCATION  
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Don Ihde, now in his seventh decade of academic life as teacher, philosopher and 
writer received his BA in 1956, M.Divinity in 1959, and PhD in 1964.  Max van 
Manen references Ihde as a phenomenological philosopher in no lesser company 
than Husserl, Scheler, Sartre, Levinas, Foucault and Ricoeur (van Manen, 
1990:181).  In his comprehensive overview of philosophy of technology, Carl 
Mitcham documents Ihde as the author of the first monograph on philosophy of 
technology in the English language (Technics and Praxis) and as someone who has 
‘…produced the most extensive corpus devoted to the subject.’ (Mitcham, 
1994:78).  Albert Borgmann describes Ihde as ‘…among the most interesting and 
provocative contemporary American philosophers.  His investigations of how we 
make sense of reality by means of technology are original and illuminating.  He 
writes with flair and wit.’  (Borgman, 2002).  More recently, introducing a new 
(fourth) generation of phenomenological philosophers of technology, Ihde locates 
himself as third generation which Achterhuis (1999/2001) had described as ‘…less 
dystopian, more pragmatic, pro-democratic, and above all each had taken an 
“empirical turn” or a turn to the analyses of concrete technologies.’ (Ihde, 2009a:x) 
 
Martin Heidegger, one of the 20th Century’s most influential thinkers radically 
refocussed attention on technology and how our lives and perceptions are shaped 
by it and Ihde’s work grew directly out of his reflections on Heidegger.  As Cohen 
& Wartofsky (1979) say, Ihde, like Heidegger, ‘…puts technology in the middle of 
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things…’.  Also after Heidegger, as we will see, Ihde has worked to distance any 
philosophy of technology away from orthodox philosophical models or 
interpretations.  However, there is a sombre codicil to appreciate regarding 
Heidegger whose role in relation to National Socialism in Germany from the 1930s 
remains controversial.  Ihde, I believe, cares deeply about the matter, at times 
talking of Heidegger’s long or dark shadow and of his ‘ghost’ still present (Ihde, 
2009a:xi).  Care is central to Ihde’s work. 
 
Given Ihde’s prodigious output and wide contributions to philosophy of technology 
I have been necessarily selective in which work to use and which approach to take.  
Forty years after Technics and Praxis not only does Ihde’s work have something 
special to say but its resistance to orthodoxies and its creative influences remain 
both timely and vibrant. 
PHILOSOPHICAL CONTEXT TO IHDE 
For many decades a broad distinction has been made between ‘analytic’ 
(sometimes ‘Anglo-American’) and ‘Continental’ philosophy.  While the 
distinction is problematic today (see e.g. Critchley, 2001) it can help us understand 
both Ihde’s philosophy and the ways his work can apply to Design and Technology 
Education.  Other distinctions occur too; for example, Mitcham’s (1994) 
juxtaposition of an ‘engineering philosophy of technology’ with a ‘humanities 
philosophy of technology’; and, Snow’s (1959/1993) thesis on the cultural 
communication gulf between ‘the arts’ and ‘the sciences’.   
 
Broadly, the analytic ‘family’ of philosophies might embrace: explanation of the 
world through natural science; valuing theory over practice; analysing using logic 
to test propositions and concepts; precise use of language; and, using prescription; 
while the continental family seeks to: describe the world as it is humanly 
experienced; is praxis-focussed - on doing and action-in-the-world; and, maintains 
human agency as a key interest.  Within and across such contrasts are familiar 
philosophical dualisms: mind-body; subject-object; materialism-idealism; theory-
practice; and so on.  While we might expect to find philosophy of technology in the 
analytic school because of technology’s historical associations with science, a 
group of praxis philosophies (as applied by Ihde) offer quite different fruits. 
 
Central to Ihde’s philosophical work are phenomenology and existentialism (see 
e.g. Dreyfus & Wrathall, 2009) and, in turn, these two come together with his 
applications of hermeneutics and pragmatism.  A significant development from the 
interplay of these four has been Ihde’s leadership in shaping post-phenomenology.  
I’ll now explore such terms in more depth. 
 
Phenomenology is perhaps best described as a philosophical movement rather than 
a ‘school’ of philosophy.  The movement defies close definition so it is for 
phenomenologists to articulate their respective stances.  Founded by Edmund 
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Husserl around 1900 it was originally foremost a theory of knowledge 
distinguishing between perceptual and abstract properties of objects and came to be 
understood as a new way of doing philosophy – the phenomenological method. 
 
Phenomenology can be considered the study of essences and involves deep 
reflection.  It distinguishes between appearance and essence and is concerned with 
judgments, perceptions, emotions.  While it probes the meaning or nature of 
phenomena (events or things), it does not produce empirical or theoretical 
observations.  It offers accounts of our lives and worlds as we experience them 
through conscious acts.  Husserls’s original formulation, viewed as transcendental 
phenomenology, called for description of what immediate experience tells us 
through a ‘reflective attentiveness’.  To achieve this it is necessary to bracket, or 
suspend, any pre-conceptions, theories or already-held explanations about the 
phenomenon encountered; hence Husserl’s famous dictum: “To the things 
themselves”.  He established the discourse around Lebenswelt, the lifeworld, the 
everyday world in which we live in our natural, taken-for-granted state; that is, not 
the theorised and already-explained, already-given world.  Here, rationalism 
hinders the cause; it constitutes a form of bias.  As Selinger says: 
‘Phenomenologists…have always tried to circumvent doxic presuppositions that 
constrain how open one can be toward pragmatically encountered phenomena.’ 
(Selinger, 2003:12) 
 
Building on the idea of lifeworld as our locus of being in the world, Heidegger 
developed his existential phenomenology (which is not existentialism), a study of 
modes of ‘being-in-the-world’, that is, of human being.  Here, the shift is from 
Husserl’s more psychological to an ontological engagement, the latter allowing for 
consideration of more peripheral aspects of one’s existence to be considered – 
things perhaps not immediately available to our senses but nonetheless aspects of 
our lifeworld.  Other concepts relating to reflections on our lifeworlds are the 
background and the horizon; on which, more below.   
 
Collectively, lifeworld, background and horizon are engaged in the field of 
hermeneutics: the theory and practice of interpretation (see e.g. Palmer, 1969; 
Gadamer, 1975/2004,1977; and, on D&T, Keirl 2015b).  Historically, hermeneutics 
was concerned with ascertaining the meaning of scriptures and in time the 
hermeneutic method was applied to any humanities-type creation.  Questions 
around true meaning are derived through interpretation rather than from facts 
produced by ‘scientific’ analysis.  So hermeneutic phenomenology ‘…is a 
descriptive…methodology because it wants to be attentive to how things appear, it 
wants to let things speak for themselves; it is an interpretive…methodology 
because it claims that there are no such things as uninterpreted phenomena.’ (van 
Manen, 1990:180). 
 
This brings us to the concepts of consciousness, intention and intentional acts.  In 
phenomenology, the subject is the person perceiving while the object (thing, event, 
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idea) is that which is perceived and the phenomenological method is grounded in 
intentionality.  Husserl argued that when we are conscious of an object what is 
happening is precisely that – we are conscious of the object, so our consciousness 
cannot occur without an attendant object.  In short, objects constitute 
consciousness.  Rather than saying that we perceive reality through representations 
of objects ‘in the mind’, we can put things otherwise and say that our 
consciousness is always towards an object.  Such an object, whether material or 
imagined, is the intentional object. 
 
Pragmatism is also a praxis philosophy concerned with our practical experiencing 
of the world.  Ideas and concepts only become valid in the context of experience.  
In pragmatic philosophy, experience plays a central role in analysis because: 
‘…efficacy in practical action…provides a standard for the determination of truth 
in the case of statements, rightness in the case of actions, and value in the case of 
appraisals.’ (Rescher, 1995:710).  Putting it otherwise, Ihde cites Richard Rorty: ‘” 
The pragmatists tell us it is the vocabulary of practice rather than theory, of action 
rather than contemplation, in which one can say something about truth…”’ (Ihde, 
2009b:10).  (For more on engagements of pragmatism with philosophy of 
technology see Hickman, 2001 and Mitcham, 2006). 
 
This Ihdean-philosophical overview now turns to postphenomenology.  ‘The 
central mode of investigation for postphenomenology is the application and 
analysis of the framework of concepts developed by Don Ihde, the founding figure 
of this perspective.  Over a long and continuing career, Ihde has adapted insights 
from the phenomenological tradition for use in the concrete description of human 
relations to technology, and has developed his own account of humanity’s 
contemporary situation.’ (Rosenberger & Verbeek, 2015:2).  Rosenberger (2009) 
suggests that postphenomenology departs from phenomenology in several respects.  
One is in its pragmatic underpinnings – it is explicitly non-foundational: ‘…rather 
than make claims about the nature of reality as phenomenologists have, 
postphenomenology focuses on relations between humans and the world.’  Another 
is because ‘…the spotlight of analysis falls heavily on the technologies which 
mediate our experience of the world.’ (Rosenberger, 2009:66).  He draws on 
Verbeek (2005) who describes how things are not neutral intermediaries but 
mediators that actively mediate our technological relations.  (Instrument-as-
mediator was a chapter in Ihde’s Technics and Praxis.)   
 
To the question ‘What is Postphenomenology?’ Ihde says: 
 
Postphenomenology is a modified, hybrid phenomenology.  On the one side, 
it recognizes the role of pragmatism in the overcoming of early modern 
epistemology and metaphysics.  It sees in classical pragmatism a way to 
avoid the problems and misunderstandings of phenomenology as a 
subjectivist philosophy, sometimes taken as antiscientific, locked into 
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idealism or solipsism.  Pragmatism has never been thought of this way, and I 
regard this as a positive feature.  On the other side, it sees in the history of 
phenomenology a development of a rigorous style of analysis through the use 
of variational theory, the deeper phenomenological understanding of 
embodiment and human active bodily perception, and a dynamic 
understanding of a lifeworld as a fruitful enrichment of pragmatism.  And, 
finally, with the emergence of the philosophy of technology, it finds a way to 
probe and analyse the role of technologies in social, personal, and cultural 
life that it undertakes by concrete – empirical – studies of technologies in the 
plural.  This then, is a minimal outline of what constitutes 
postphenomenology. (Ihde, 2009b:23). 
IHDE’S APPROACH AND KEY CONCEPTS  
Turning to Ihde more closely we can alaborate some of the concepts and 
approaches he has developed since Technics and Praxis.  Ihde only selectively 
addresses Technology (big ‘T’) thus avoiding a monolithic view – one that sees all 
technologies in some universal way, for example, as artefacts.  He works with 
concrete examples of particular technologies using praxical philosophical methods 
to help us better understand our technologically mediated lifeworlds and the 
intimate and co-constituted multiple realities that exist amongst us, technologies, 
and society.   
 
In navigating the field of technology and its relations, Ihde engages many 
significant questions and debates, evidence indeed of the philosophical richness of 
our field.  Thus: how like or unlike is life within our technosystem from previous 
forms of life that humans have taken up?  What is the relationship between science 
and technology?  Are technologies neutral?  Do we accept or reject the concepts of 
social and technological determinism? Where is technology in the background or in 
the foreground? Is technology autonomous?  Is there a dualism of natural-artificial?  
What are the dystopian/utopian interpretations of technology in different historical 
moments and locations?  Does a technological fix favour utopianism (or 
dystopianism)?  What do technological developments mean for our species?  Is 
technology controllable?  If so, under whose authority?  Is control democratic or 
technocratic or totalitarian?  Is control centralised or local?  Does hi-tech 
colonialism disrupt other cultures and/or corrupt of tradition(al cultures)? 
 
As Ihde shows continuously, philosophy cannot provide formulaic answers to such 
questions, nor are there any simple answers.  However, there are two things a 
philosophy can do: it can provide a perspective from which to view the 
phenomenon of technology, or better, the phenomenon of human-technology 
relations.  Second, it can provide a framework or “paradigm” for understanding.’  
(Ihde, 1990:9).  In seeking perspective, he says, the right amount of distance is 
needed in order to see the uniqueness and the peculiarity of technological culture.  
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Likening critical thinking to seeing, he notes that both what is at the tip of one’s 
nose and what is beyond the horizon ‘are simply not discernable’.  He points out 
that taking static positions to view and interpret technologies is rarely completely 
helpful.  Better, he says, that we see ourselves as navigators in oft-changing 
situations, rather than static observers, when considering our relations with 
technologies. 
 
Eschewing theory-practice distinctions associated with deeper mind-body 
dualisms, Ihde calls for a praxis approach capable of evaluating positively ‘...the 
phenomena of perception and embodiment’ (Ihde, 1979:xix) and, specifically: 
‘Phenomenology with its rediscovery of the ‘primacy of perception’ and its 
emphasis upon concrete forms of objectification…becomes a praxis philosophy 
from which a ‘materialist’ interpretation of technology can arise.’ (Ihde, 1979:xxv).  
In developing his position out of the ‘so-called Continental philosophies’, he cites 
existentialism, phenomenology, ‘some strains of pragmatism’, along with 
dialectical Marxian forms.  Of these, he shows how the work of Marx articulated 
issues around alienation, modes of production, utopian/dystopian takes on 
technology, and the question of technologies’ (non-)neutrality.  He also signals the 
way existentialism confronts human-technology relations in enlightened or 
unenlightened; optimistic or pessimistic; empowering or disempowering ways. 
(Ihde, 1979:xxiv-xxv).   
Technology-science relations 
Describing the need to find new ways of understanding technologies, Ihde noted 
‘…a long previous silence on the part of most philosophical traditions…’ and 
advanced the praxis philosophies which ‘…broadly defined, are those which in 
some way make a theory of action primary.  Theory of action precedes or grounds 
a theory of knowledge.’ (1979:xv).  This last point draws in the question of the 
relationship of philosophy of technology to philosophy of science.  In 
counterposing analytic philosophy (derived from logical positivism) with 
phenomenology Ihde speculated that, in the origins of both, technology would have 
been of little interest having largely been considered ‘at best’ applied science (Ihde, 
1979 xviii).   As he notes, ‘To assume that technology is applied science, that 
engineering is dependent upon science, that technology is made possible by science 
– all revolves around a presumed primacy of ‘theory’ over ‘practice’, of ‘mind’ 
over ‘body’….adding that ‘…if there is a ‘paradigm’ within the dominant tradition 
regarding a science-technology relation, it is one which simply takes for granted 
the primacy of science.’ (Ihde, 1979:xxii).   
 
Ihde (1979) notes that many ethical and political-social questions concerning 
technology are directed toward the effects of technologies.  Having noted that 
ethics comes too late to technology (see also Keirl, 2009) and that, by tradition, 
technology is inadequately positioned as ‘a merely neutral instrument’ of science, 
Ihde took to contemplating a different interpretation of the science-technology 
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relation.  In drawing the analogy of the mind-body relation, he suggested that each 
relation could be inverted.  That is, we might talk of a technology-science relation 
with (after Heidegger) technology as the origin or cause of science and a body-
mind relation with body as likewise source of, or inspiration for, mind.  In 
philosophical terms Ihde was developing a shift from an idealist primacy to a 
materialist primacy. 
 
In 1979, Cohen & Wartofsky speculated that ‘More than likely, inherited 
parochialisms and prejudices deriving from the dominant tradition in philosophy of 
science will continue to shape contemporary work.  All the more reason for the 
anti-parochial and broadening impact of Ihde’s studies…’ (1979:xii).  Philosophy 
of technology could never stand a reasonable chance of either clear identity or 
success as a discipline so long as it was tied to the apron strings of a philosophy of 
science any more, I would argue, than if it were tied to the apron strings of any 
other discipline (sociology comes to mind).  However, there are clear links and 
parallels across disciplines and Ihde’s work, engaging with earlier Latour (1987) 
explored, en route to a philosophy of technology, ways of looking at both fields as 
well as promoting the concept of technoscience.   
 
Ihde (1991) argued that a principal shift in how science had been practised resulted 
from the development of increasingly sophisticated (technological) 
instrumentation. ‘I thus read the philosophy of science through its need for and 
neglect of a concern for technology.’ (Ihde, 1991:xii).  In developing his praxis-
perception model of the philosophies of both fields he shows how science is what it 
is because it became technologically embodied through instrumentation.  Science 
cannot ‘be’ without technology.  Ihde, here, was bringing phenomenology and 
ontology to interface the philosophies of technology and science.  Furthermore, his 
work was shifting the dominant view of a science-driven technology toward one of 
technology-driven science, in fact one of technologically-embedded science.  In his 
summary position, written almost three decades ago, Ihde comments; “Today’s Big 
Science is so closely tied to Big Technology that one can meaningfully speak of a 
single, complex phenomenon which is both scientific technology and technological 
science: technoscience.’ (Ihde,, 1991:138).  Twelve years later came the 
publication of the teasingly entitled Chasing Technoscience: Matrix for materiality 
(Ihde & Selinger., 2003).  The text’s explorations of the material dimension of 
technoscience are enlightening for how they engage the thinking of four leading 
theorists and authors: Donna Haraway (cyborgs); Ihde (postphenomenology); 
Bruno Latour (actor-network theory); and, Andrew Pickering (the dance of agency 
and the mangle of practice).  
Technology and the Lifeworld 
In the early 1990s, two Ihde texts came in close succession.  Prior to Instrumental 
Realism (1991) was Technology and the Lifeworld (1990) which offers us a useful 
overview of Ihde’s thinking and approach to the challenges facing philosophy of 
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technology in the context of major global and existential concerns.  Using the sub-
title From garden to earth Ihde draws a thread from a non-technological Eden to 
an imaginative New Garden applying, as usual, rich and concrete examples.  In 
setting out his philosophical stance he never betrays his sense of care for the planet, 
for people and for inter-cultural, inter-faith wellbeing.   
 
For Ihde, lifeworld ‘…locate(s) the inquiry within the traditions of phenomenology 
and its related hermeneutic origins’ while interpreting human experience with a 
concern for perception and bodily activity and his approach moves from a 
phenomenology of human-technology relations to a hermeneutics of technology-
cultural embeddedness. (Ihde, 1990:21).  Ihde distinguishes perception in two 
senses – microperception which is immediate, and focussed bodily through the 
senses – and macroperception which he describes as cultural or hermeneutic.  
These two dimensions of perception ‘…belong equally to the lifeworld…are 
intertwined…There is no microperception (sensory-bodily) without its location 
within a field of macroperception and no macroperception without its 
microperceptual foci.’ (Ihde, 1990:29). 
Technology relations and our lifeworld 
Ihde deepens our understandings of how we are technologically situated in our 
lifeworlds by articulating four sets of relations and the concept of horizonal 
phenomena. 
 
Embodiment relations  ‘If much of early modern science gained its new vision of 
the world through optical technologies, the process of embodiment itself is both 
much older and more pervasive.  To embody one’s praxis through technologies is 
ultimately an existential relation with the world.  It is something humans have 
always…done.’ (Ihde, 1990:72)  Whether citing spectacles, a hearing aid or a blind 
person’s cane, Ihde calls such existential technological relations with the world 
embodiment relations.  The technologies are adopted into one’s way of perceiving 
the world through such technologies.  One’s perceptual and bodily sense is 
transformed in reflexive ways by engaging with them. 
CHAPTER TITLE 
9 
Hermeneutic technics  Whereas, in his embodiment relations, the self and the 
technology work together in relation to the world, in his hermeneutic relations, the 
self is in relation to the technology-in-the-world combination.  While the self in 
these respective scenarios is in differing perceptual positions, Ihde notes that ‘…in 
the broader sense, interpretation pervades both embodiment and hermeneutic 
action.’ (Ihde, 1990: 93).  He also notes that a possible confusion can arise from 
the fact that there is a double sense in which a technology can be used: ‘It may be 
used simultaneously both as something through which one experiences and as 
something to which one relates.’ (Ihde, 1990: 93). (Spectacles offer an example 
where they are worn ‘to see’ yet also bring the ‘self’ into a special relationship with 
a focussed-on technology-in-the-world.) 
 
Alterity relations  
Alterity is about otherness, about alternatives (as in alter ego, that is, a state of 
being that is radically different form one’s regular, conscious self.)  In 
phenomenological terms there is distinction between the self and that which is not 
self, that is, that which is other; and there is an assumption of being able to detach 
oneself in order to attain alternative ways of ‘seeing’ a technology.  Ihde 
characterises alterity relations as relations to or with a technology and notes how 
strange this must seem to anyone limited to ‘…the habits of objectivist accounts (in 
which) technologies as objects usually come first rather than last’ (Ihde, 1990:97) 
and where ‘definition’ is sought solely by reference to an object’s characteristics 
and technical properties.  Ihde works to avoid what he sees as a Heideggerian 
tendency to see the otherness of technology in negative terms.  Rather he espouses 
‘…an analysis of the positive or presentential senses in which humans relate to 
technologies…to technology-as-other.’ (Ihde 1990:98) 
 
Background relations  Here, Ihde addresses not technologies in the foreground of 
one’s life and technology relations, immediate and to-hand but, rather, ‘…those 
which remain in the background or become a kind of near-technological 
environment itself.’ (Ihde, 1990:108)  Setting aside discarded or no-longer-used 
technologies (loosely, junk) he gives examples of technologies designed to 
function in the background such as semi-automatic and automatic machines and 
systems.  Another example he proffers is that of human-made forms of shelter (of 
whatever type may be found around the planet) which are not with us at all times 
but are part of what he calls a ‘field-like background’.  While, individually, all such 
technologies are in the background, collectively they contribute to what Ihde calls 
our technologically textured world/s.  He also usefully talks of the ‘absent 
presence’ of such technologies. 
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Horizonal phenomena  ‘…(H)orizonal phenomena…mark the boundaries of a 
phenomenology’  Here, horizon, for Ihde, is a ‘…limit concept…beyond which the 
inquiry ceases to display its internal characteristics.’ (Ihde, 1990: 112).  As with 
the common understanding of the term, the horizon never comes nearer although 
he admits that ‘…the question of the extremities beyond which there is no 
recovery, where perhaps technologies cease to be technologies, remains 
intriguing.’ (Ihde, 1990:112-113).  He explains further that ‘…whether we refer to 
a kind of inner horizon (the fringes of embodiment) or the extremities of the 
external horizon (the ultimate form of texturing that a specific technological culture 
may take), the result is one of “atmosphere”.’ (Ihde, 1990:114).  Examples of such 
atmospheres could be pessimism around nuclear threat or the optimism once 
prevalent that technology could save us from the great ills of the world such as 
war, famine, and disease.   
Thus, ultimately, Ihde brings us fully through a continuum from our tangible body 
relations with technologies to relations which are present, ‘out there’ and 
atmosphere-creating.  All such human-technology relations are shapers of our 
lifeworld/s.  Equally, all such lifeworlds constitute our technologically textured 
cultures. 
Cultural hermeneutics 
Ihde moves away from the immediate human experience of technologies to take a 
perspective on cultural hermeneutics, on how cultures embed technologies.  He 
breaks these into the following inquiries: 
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Technology transfer – technologies as cultural instruments.  Here Ihde engages 
with how we (and cultures) both adopt technologies and adapt to them in new ways 
– ways that alter our behaviours and cultural norms.  Obvious illustrations come 
from ancient tribal and Aboriginal cultures encountering technologies from 
colonising or invasive other cultures (e.g. Diamond, 1998) but, as Ihde cautions, 
the adaptation of a transferred technology ‘…depends upon its being able to fit into 
an extant praxis.  But even when it is adapted, the context of significations may 
differ quite radically relative to the sedimented type of praxis in the recipient 
culture.’ (Ihde, 1990:127).  In other words, adoptions and adaptations are never 
assuredly consistent or known. (viz Nixon, 1996; Tenner, 1997; Ihde, 2006). 
Neocolonialism as the failure of transfer.  Whilst there are issues around 
technology transfer in a cultural-instrumental sense, Ihde also points to the kind of 
resistances that can be encountered regarding the associated infrastructure 
necessary for successful transfer to occur.  It is often not simply a matter of 
embedding ‘the technology’ but culturally acceptable changes are needed to ways 
of working, being, maintaining, and so on.  Supportive public awareness and 
education systems are needed too.  If a public is under-educated about the related 
consequences then ethical arguments arise around the agendas of those committing 
the transfer.  While more technicians may be needed to support the introduction of 
a particular technology, there is also at play an ethically problematic argument 
around whether education might be expected to enculturate a populace towards 
acceptance of the incoming technology. 
“Controlling” technology.  While Ihde argues that the idea of ‘controlling’ 
technology is misconceived, he urges that the debates around any such control 
should not be dismissed and signals the ‘serious politics surrounding technological 
development’, pointing to the ethics of matters too.  ‘The type and degree of 
technology assessment currently practiced is clearly too minimal and primitive – as 
well as too controlled by those who need to be “controlled”.’  Regarding the 
quantitative thinking applied to risk assessment, he argues: ‘The very agencies 
whose practices must be assessed insist that the terms of assessment be 
technocratic in form.  In turn, the style of assessment becomes modelled upon the 
most quantitative of ethical and political theory – some variation of utilitarianism.’ 
(Ihde, 1990:143). 
 
He suggests that the question of controlling technologies be re-framed because it 
‘…either assumes that technologies are “merely” instrumental and thus implicitly 
neutral, or it assumes that technologies are fully determinative and uncontrollable.  
Both extremities…miss the point of the human-technology and the culture-
technology relativities that would reconstitute the debate.’ (Ihde, 1990:140).  As he 
says, even if the analogous question were put: ‘Can cultures be controlled?’ the 
degree of complexity to be considered reveals how a positive answer becomes nigh 
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impossible.  He neatly adds: ‘There is even good reason to see the twentieth-
century concern for “control” of technology as the contemporary equivalent of the 
nineteenth-century obsession with the “control” of nature.  Neither question, in my 
estimation, is posed properly.’ (Ihde, 1990:140). 
Technology-culture embeddedness as multistable   
At one point of developing his lifeworld take on technologies, Ihde summarises his 
position thus: ‘Negatively, I have argued that there is no single or unified trajectory 
to “Technology” (with the capital “T”), that technologies…are not “autonomous”, 
and that the very framing of the question of “control” is put wrongly.  Positively I 
have argued that technologies are non-neutral and essentially, but structurally, 
ambiguous…(T)echnologies transform experience and its variations…(and) that at 
the complex level of a cultural hermeneutics, technologies may be variantly 
embedded…’ (Ihde, 1990:144).  He draws explicitly on the phenomenology of 
perception work of Merleau-Ponty (1945/1965) and introduces the term 
multistability.  Ihde shows how common examples of psychologies of perception 
are essentially bi-stable (the Necker cube is a favourite - it can be perceived ‘this 
way or that’).  However, as with the phenomenological method in general, 
‘Phenomenology goes much further in the analysis of perceptual multistability. Its 
aim is to examine the variations exhaustively to show structural or invariant 
features.  With the search of possibility-structures in mind, such an analysis further 
deconstructs such multistable objects.’  (‘object’ here being the object of 
phenomenological attention) (Ihde, 1990:144). 
 
Further iterations 
Finally, I share three Ihdean iterations which further reflect his 
postphenomenology. 
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The Designer Fallacy  Ihde also uses the multistability concept to resist ideas of 
technological, or social, determinism.  In a succinct and useful contribution to 
discussions of design-as-intention he presents ‘The Designer Fallacy’ (Ihde, 
2006:121) drawing on a notion espoused a century earlier regarding literature and 
much of the arts in general – that of the ‘intentional fallacy’.  The thinking was that 
we would understand meanings of texts and artworks if we could uncover an 
author’s or artist’s intentions.  Ihde identifies and explores two ‘interstices in a 
three-part relation.’  These spaces or in-betweens are, first that between designer-
inventor and materiality and, second, between the artefact and user.  In the first 
there is no simple control by designer over material – the situation is exploratory, 
iterative and interactive - and in the second, the designer has even less control and 
the user becomes the more important.  As he says: ‘The indeterminacy here is 
multistable in terms of the possible range of uses fantasized or actualized…Both 
the designer-materiality and the artefact-user relations are complex and 
multistable….(and)…are not of any simple “deterministic” pattern.’ (Ihde, 
2006:130).   
Bodies in Technology (Ihde, 2002)  At the turn of the 21st Century emergent 
technologies were not only throwing up new possibilities of empowerment but they 
were giving rise to new existential reflections and research possibilities across 
disciplines.  Ihde articulates how ‘(w)e are our body in the sense in which 
phenomenology understands our motile, perceptual, and emotive being-in-the-
world’ but we are also bodies in socially and culturally constructed ways.  
Traversing these two ‘dimensions’ is the technological dimension – Ihde’s 
embodiment relation – how we experience our worlds through technologies.  
Witnessing the convergence of virtual, simulation and computer-modelled 
technologies in media, medicine and science more generally, he concludes thus: 
‘We are our bodies – but in that very basic notion one also discovers that our 
bodies have an amazing plasticity and polymorphism that is often brought out 
precisely in our relations with technologies.  We are bodies in technologies.’ (Ihde, 
2002:138). 
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Towards posthumanity?  In his foreword to the Olsen et al. (2009) text, Ihde writes 
of new and emergent issues and arguments.  He notes how the ‘posts’ of 
postphenomenology, posthumanism and postmodernism are ‘all on stage’ and he 
asks: ‘From the range of fashionable enhancement to virtual species manipulation, 
where do our nano-, bio-, and medical technologies lead? (Ihde, 2009:xi).  As we 
once again face unknown futures which will assuredly be technological, to say that 
we are becoming, or are already, ‘bodies in technologies’ is to invoke discussion of 
the trans- or post-human (see Bostrom, 2009).  In typical ubiquitous style, Ihde had 
already shaken the tree by turning the question back on itself in his essay: ‘Of 
which human are we post?’ (Ihde, 2008).  Drawing on Francis Bacon’s notion of 
four idols to be avoided as a (then) new era was dawning, Ihde offers his own four 
idols to be avoided when discussing human, posthuman and transhuman issues: 
• the idol of Paradise  (technofantasies) 
• the idol of Intelligent Design (design arrogance) 
• the idol of the Cyborg (hybridising ourselves with machine and animal 
combinations) 
• the idol of Prediction (gambling on futures) 
 
‘I suggest here, that only if humans are stupid enough to end up worshipping the 
very idols they create, could the fantasized replacement of humans by machines 
take place.  Rather, the changing technologies with which we interact, form 
collectives, (or) experience the dances of agencies, do forecast vastly changed 
conditions of work and play and even love, but it is not them versus us.’ (Ihde, 
2008:56-57)  (See Hallström Chapter XX in this text) 
 
What, then,  can education make of Ihde’s work and his ways of looking at our 
technological being? 
BRINGING IHDE TO TECHNOLOGY EDUCATION 
My own curriculum inquiry is driven by one question: ‘Why is it…when the 
phenomenon of technology constitutes such a pervasive and hegemonic part of life 
on the planet, that it is so ill-addressed in education?’ (Keirl, 2007:77).  How can 
we help students really see and understand the roles technologies play in their 
lives?  That Ihde has much to offer Design and Technology (D&T) Education I 
have absolutely no doubt.  How to realise this raises two broad questions.  First, to 
what extent is D&T willing to adopt and adapt phenomenological approaches into 
its way of being?  Second, in what ways is it inhibited from doing so?  To answer 
these we have both to take stock of where we are now and to assess our potential to 
adopt and adapt.  Such assessments are necessarily philosophical, political, 
professional, and pedagogical. 
 
Philosophically, ‘Western-style’ education systems are historically grounded in the 
analytic/logical-positivist mode, and despite many countries practising alternative 
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religio-philosophical traditions (Buddhism, Taoism, Confucianism), there is an 
increasingly ‘Western’ influence across the globe whereby knowledge is seen as 
readily identifiable, quantifiable, teachable, and assessable.  The epistemological 
frame is prescriptive and praxis-type philosophical approaches are peripheral to the 
main game.  Despite Deweyan pragmatism (e.g. Dewey, 1916/1966), nascent 
Anglo-American philosophy of education from the 1960s onwards was strongly 
analytic (witness Phenix’s (1964) Realms of Meaning or Hirst’s (1974) Forms of 
Knowledge and their inability to accommodate anything like D&T other than as, 
perhaps, craft or applied science).  Today, matters are compounded politically by 
the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development’s (OECD) thinly-
veiled agenda on education for capitalism by competitive assessment regimes in 
the valorised three ‘subjects’ of first language (at a functional level), mathematics 
and science.  (Keirl, 2015a) Notable by their absence are the very subjects which 
resist positivist assessment – we might call them the humanities, which might 
include D&T. 
 
This said, for some decades now there have been moves towards at post-modern 
curricular innovation and these have opened up some curriculum controversies 
which, I have argued, apply to D&T (Keirl, 2012).  Apart from any philosophical 
differences, such controversies emanate from critiques of the very purposes of 
education, that is, they are political and engage questions of the role of education 
for democracy; education’s relationship with economies; the preparation of young 
people for active citizenship; and so on.  D&T finds itself caught up in all such 
matters to some degree or other (Keirl, 2006) and it can choose to be marginalised, 
be a passive onlooker, or it can be a mainstream player in the curriculum game. 
 
There is a spectrum we can consider that runs from indoctrination, to 
enculturation, to training, to education.  What differentiates these are the degrees 
of critical thinking, capacity for autonomy, reflection and responsibility achieved 
(or not), that is, they are the kinds of attributes that can create fulfilled individuals 
and strong, participatory democracy.  D&T in many of its orthodox guises has 
undoubtedly operated in a positivist mode of utilitarian skilling, training and 
industry preparation.  Ironically, D&T is potentially an educationally exciting beast 
that remains trapped in an educational straitjacket. 
 
To see where Ihde and (post)phenomenology comes in we turn to how he so 
cogently brings the technological world out of the background.  His interrogations 
of technologies are such that we begin to ‘see’ them in their fullness far more than 
as mere object or thing (in the utilitarian sense).  This at once provides 
opportunities for students to learn more fully about technologies’ multiple and 
diverse society-, culture- and existence-shaping roles.  By adopting/adapting Ihde’s 
phenomenological approach to human-technology-world relations, by considering 
technologies as key to lifeworlds, and by anticipating his idols, D&T can make 
curricular adjustments to enrich its offering and value to students.  How then can a 
holistic conceptualisation of Ihde’s technological world be brought to the 
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classroom?  Here, the concept of technological literacy arises.  In simple terms, 
three possibilities occur: a) D&T remains a subject of utility and training while art, 
science and social studies attempt to take on other aspects of technology 
‘education’ (fragmented approach); b) a whole-school technological literacy 
approach is taken where every teacher’s responsibility is towards a programme 
rich enough to articulate Ihde’s holism; or, c) a comprehensive approach which 
articulates both (a) and (b). 
 
Clearly, this isn’t going to happen overnight but Ihde would be the first to examine 
every possible option and invert the challenges to create opportunities.  So far as 
curriculum and pedagogy are concerned there are some immediate advantages.  
First, we are currently free from the OECD-style testing regimes and thus have 
some, relative curriculum freedom.  Second, design is a magnificent educational 
enabler.  Like phenomenology it has no prescriptive strategies or ‘right’ answers; it 
can allow for suspension of judgment (bracketing as ‘what if’) to amplify 
possibilities; and, it sharpens intellectual capacities for seeing and being.  Third, 
competing complex values systems and relations can be foregrounded to facilitate 
democratic discussion of technological presences and possibilities.  Fourth, the 
currently pernicious STEM agenda of positivist instrumentalism can have its weak 
epistemological basis challenged.  Fifth, we can erode the orthodoxies of 
technology as objects; as hi-tech; as applied science; and, as inevitable (Keirl, 
2006).  Sixth, we can articulate a publicly defensible form of D&T education that 
resists popular stereotyping – of either the subject or technologies-in-the-world.  
Finally, D&T can be, if not a curriculum leader, then at least a serious and central 
curriculum player – not at the horizon of matters. 
 
In all such ways D&T can make rich contributions to the education of each student 
and to the wellbeing of democratic life.  Perhaps the simplest starting point I could 
advocate is that of, first, seeing education itself as a technology (in that it is a 
human-designed-and-made entity) and, second, applying Ihde’s 
(post)phenomenological methods to it to see what emerges.  Ihde would not see as 
a crisis all the major problems facing us globally today.  Nor would he ever neglect 
them.  His way is to at all times journey with curiosity and optimism.  
Phenomenology can help all D&T players see and be in new ways because it is a 
method of looking otherwise at problematic phenomena which humans have 
created and which are now challenging existences locally and globally.  If it has 
taken forty years of Ihde’s work to move phenomenology centre-stage of 
Technology’s drama, then we can either say ‘there’s no point because we can’t 
wait that long for education to change’ or we can start now in our pedagogy, school 
policy making, community actions and political arrangements.  If lived experience 
is what counts for persons’, for cultures’ and for societies’ wellbeing then the 
praxis philosophies time must have come for education. 
 
The phenomenological act, properly conducted, is an educational act.  If the praxis 
philosophies are experientially focussed then where better to articulate them than 
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through the doing field of enlightened D&T education (I see doing in multiple 
ways here – critiquing, designing, making, creating).  As van Manen says: 
‘Phenomenology demands of us re-learning to look at the world as we meet it in 
immediate experience’ (1990:184) and he reports that Merleau-Ponty describes the 
work of phenomenology as ‘painstaking’.  ‘Making’ the invisible visible is no 
small task but if our relations with each other and with the planet matter then we 
must find ways to educate about technologies’ intimate roles in our lifeworlds.  
Ihde offers us rich possibilities.  Is Design and Technology Education up to the 
challenge? 
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